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Abstract
In traditional models for word-of-mouth recommendations and viral marketing,
the objective function has generally been based on reaching as many people as
possible. However, a number of studies have shown that the indiscriminate spread of
a product by word-of-mouth can result in overexposure, reaching people who evaluate
it negatively. This can lead to an effect in which the over-promotion of a product
can produce negative reputational effects, by reaching a part of the audience that is
not receptive to it.
How should one make use of social influence when there is a risk of overexposure?
In this paper, we develop and analyze a theoretical model for this process; we show
how it captures a number of the qualitative phenomena associated with overexposure,
and for the main formulation of our model, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm
to find the optimal marketing strategy. We also present simulations of the model
on real network topologies, quantifying the extent to which our optimal strategies
outperform natural baselines.
1 Introduction
A rich line of research has studied the effectiveness of marketing strategies based on
person-to-person recommendation within a social network — a process often termed
viral marketing [13] and closely connected to the broader sociological literature on the
diffusion of innovations in social networks [25]. A key genre of theoretical question that
emerged early in this literature is the problem of optimally “seeding” a product in a
social network through the selection of a set of initial adopters [9, 15, 24]. In this class of
questions, we consider a firm that has a product they would like to market to a group
of agents on a social network; it is often the case that the firm cannot target all the
participants in the network, and so they seek to target the most influential ones so as to
maximize exposure and create a cascade of adoptions. Approaches to this question have
generally been based on objective functions in which the goal is to maximize the number
of people who are reached by the network cascade — or more generally, in which the
objective function monotonically increases in the number of people reached.
The dangers of overexposure. Separately from this, lines of research in both market-
ing and in the dynamics of on-line information have provided diverse evidence that the
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benefits of a marketing campaign are not in fact purely increasing in the number of people
reached. An influential example of such a finding is the Groupon effect, in which viral
marketing via Groupon coupons leads to lower Yelp ratings. In [6], they note the negative
effect Groupon has on average Yelp ratings and provide arguments for the underlying
mechanism; one of their central hypotheses is that by using Groupon as a matchmaker,
businesses may be attracting customers from a portion of the population that is less
inclined to like the product. In another example, Kovcs and Sharkey [16] discuss a setting
on Goodreads where books that win prestigious awards (or are short-listed for them)
attract more readers following the announcement, which again leads to a drop in the
average rating of the book on the platform. Aizen et al. [1] show a similar effect for
on-line videos and other media; they receive a discontinuous drop in their ratings when a
popular blog links to them, driving users to the item who may not be interested in it.
Research in marketing has shown that exposure to different groups and influence
between such groups can help or hurt adoption [5, 11, 12]. For example, Hu and Van den
Bulte [11] argue that agents adopt products to boost their status; and so as word-of-mouth
effects for a product become stronger among middle-income individuals, there might
be a negative impact on adoption among higher-income individuals. Similar behavior
is observed in health campaigns. In [28], Wakefield et al. discuss the importance of
segmenting populations and exposing groups to anti-smoking campaigns whose themes
the group is most susceptible to in order to maximize the impact of future campaigns.
We think of these effects collectively as different forms of overexposure; while reaching
many potential customers is not a concern in and of itself, the empirical research above
suggests that there may exist particular subsets of the population — potentially large
subsets — who will react negatively to the product. When a marketing cascade reaches
members of this negatively inclined subset, the marketing campaign can suffer negative
payoff that may offset the benefits it has received from other parts of the population.
This negative payoff can come in the form of harm to the firm’s reputation, either through
latent consumer impressions and effects on brand loyalty [7, 8] or through explicitly
visible negative reviews on rating sites.
Despite the importance of these considerations in marketing, they have not been
incorporated into models of influence-based marketing in social networks. What types
of algorithmic issues arise when we seek to spread a word-of-mouth cascade through a
network, but must simultaneously ensure that it reaches the “right” part of the audience
— the potential customers who will like the product, rather than those who will react
negatively to it?
The present work: A model of cascades with the risk of overexposure. In this
paper, we propose a basic theoretical model for the problem of seeding a cascade when
there are benefits from reaching positively inclined customers and costs from reaching
negatively inclined customers.
There are many potential factors that play a role in the distinction between positively
and negatively inclined customers, and for our model we focus on a stylized framework
in which each product has a known parameter φ in the interval [0, 1] that serves as
some measure for the breadth of its appeal. At this level of generality, this parameter
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could serve as a proxy for a number of things, including quality; or a one-dimensional
combination of price and quality; or — in the case where the social network represents
a population defined by a specific interest — compatibility with the core interests of
network’s members.
Each node in the network is an agent who will evaluate the product when they first
learn of it; agents differ in how critical they are of new products, with agents of low
criticality tending to like a wider range of products and agents of high criticality tending
to reject more products. Thus, each agent i has a criticality parameter θi in the interval
[0, 1]; since we assume that the firm has a history of marketing products to this network
over a period of time, it knows this parameter θi. When exposed to a product, an agent
accepts the product if φ ≥ θi and advertises the product to their neighbors, leading to
the potential for a cascade. However, if φ < θi, then the agent rejects the product, which
results in a negative payoff to the firm; the cascade stops at such agents i, since they do
not advertise it to their neighbors.
The firm’s goal is to advertise the product to a subset of the nodes in the network
— the seed set — resulting in a potential cascade of further nodes who learn about the
product, so as to maximize its overall payoff. This payoff includes a positive term for
each agent i who sees the product and has φ ≥ θi, and a negative term for each agent i
who sees the product and has φ < θi; agents who are never reached by the cascade never
find out about the product, and the firm gets zero payoff from them.
Overview of Results. We obtain theoretical results for two main settings of this
problem: the unbudgeted case, in which the firm can initially advertise the product to
an arbitrary seed set of nodes, and the budgeted case, in which the firm can advertise
the project to at most k nodes, for a given parameter k. We note that typically in
influence maximization problems, the unbudgeted case is not interesting: if the payoff is
monotonically increasing in the number of nodes who are exposed to the product, then
the optimal unbudgeted strategy is simply to show the product to everyone. In a world
with negative payoffs from overexposure, however, the unbudgeted optimzation problem
becomes non-trivial: we must tradeoff the benefits of showing the product to customers
who will like it against the negatives that arise when these customers in turn share it
with others who do not.
For the unbudgeted problem, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding the
optimal seed set. The algorithm uses network flow techniques on a graph derived from
the underlying social network with the given set of parameters θi. In contrast, we provide
an NP-hardness result for the budgeted problem.
We then provide a natural generalization of the model: rather than each agent exhibit-
ing only two possible behaviors (rejecting the product, or accepting it and promoting it),
we allow for a wider range of agent behaviors. In particular, we will assume each agent
has three parameters which control whether the agent ignores the product, views but
rejects the product, accepts the product but does not broadcast it to its neighbors, and
accepts the product and advertises it to neighbors. We show how to extend our results to
this more general case, obtaining a polynomial-time algorithm for the unbudgeted case
and an NP-hardness result for the budgeted case.
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Finally, we perform computational simulations of our algorithm for the unbudgeted
case on sample network topologies derived from moderately-sized social networks. We find
an interesting effect in which the performance of the optimal algorithm transitions between
two behaviors as φ varies. For small φ the payoff grows slowly while a baseline that
promotes the product to every agent i with θi < φ achieves negative payoff (reflecting the
consequences of overexposure). Then, for large φ, the payoff grows quickly, approaching
a simple upper bound consisting of all i for which θi < φ.
2 Preliminaries
There is a product with a parameter φ ∈ [0, 1], measuring the breadth of its appeal. G
is an unweighted, undirected graph with n agents as its nodes. For each agent i, the
agent’s criticality parameter θi ∈ [0, 1] measures the minimum threshold for φ the agent
demands before adoption. Thus, higher values of θi correspond to more critical agents.
We assume that these values are fixed and known to the firm.
The firm chooses an initial set of agents S ⊆ V to “seed” with the product. If an
agent i sees the product, it accepts it if θi ≤ φ and rejects it if θi > φ. We say that an
agent i is accepting in the former case and rejecting in the latter case. Each accepting
agent who is exposed to the product advertises it to their neighbors, who then, recursively,
are also exposed to the product. We will assume throughout that the firm chooses a seed
set consisting entirely of accepting nodes (noting, of course, that rejecting nodes might
subsequently be exposed to the product after nodes in the seed set advertise it to their
neighbors).
We write V (S) for the set of agents exposed to the product if the seed set is S.
Formally, V (S) is the set of all agents i who have a path to some node in j ∈ S such
that all of the internal nodes on the i-j path are accepting agents; this is the “chain of
recommendations” by which the product reached i. Among the nodes in V (S), we define
V +(S) to be the set of agents who accept the product and V −(S) to be the set of agents
who reject the product.
The payoff function associated with seed set S is:
pi(S) = |V +(S)| − |V −(S)|. (1)
We can, more generally, assume that there is a payoff of p to accepting the product and
a negative payoff of q to rejecting the product, and we set the payoff function to be:
pi(S) = p|V +(S)| − q|V −(S)|. (2)
We will call this the generalized payoff function, and simply refer to Equation 1 as the
payoff function. The overarching question then is:
Problem 1. Given a set of agents V with criticality parameters θi (i ∈ V ) on a social
network G = (V,E), and given a product of quality φ, what is the optimal seed set S ⊆ V
that the firm should target in order to maximize the payoff given by Equation (2)?
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In contrast to much of the influence maximization literature, we assume that the
agents’ likelihood of adoption, once exposed to this product, is not affected by which of
their neighbors have accepted or rejected the product. This differs from, for instance,
models in which each agent requires a certain fraction (or number) of its neighbors to have
accepted the product before it does; or models where probabilistic contagion takes place
across the edges. These all form interesting directions for further work; here, however,
we focus on questions in which the intrinsic appeal of the product, via φ, determines
adoption decisions, and the social network provides communication pathways for other
agents to hear about the product.
Before proceeding to the main result, we develop some further terminology that will
be helpful in reasoning about the seed sets.
Definition 2. Let i be an accepting node, and let S = {i}. Then we say that V (S) is
the cluster of i, denoted by Ci; we call V
+(S) the interior of Ci and denote it by C
o
i , and
we call V −(S) the boundary of Ci and denote it by Cbi .
We denote the payoff corresponding to the seed set S = {i} by pii. Note that,
pii = p|Coi | − q|Cbi |.
Lemma 3. Given an accepting node i ∈ V , and a node j ∈ Coi , we have Ci = Cj.
Proof. If j is in the interior of Ci, then there exists a path (k1, k2, · · · , k`) in G, where
i = k1 and j = k` such that each node along the path has θ ≤ φ. (That is, each node ki
is exposed to and accepts the product as a result of ki−1’s advertisement.) We would like
to prove that if S = {j}, then i would be exposed to the product. Equivalently, we want
to show there exists a path from j to i of nodes with θ ≤ φ; but this is precisely the path
(k`, k`−1, · · · , k1).
For an arbitrary seed set S, the set V (S) may consist of multiple interior-disjoint
clusters, which we label by {C1, C2, · · · , Ck}, where k ≤ |S|. Note that each of these
clusters might be associated with more than one agent in the seed set and that ∪ki=1Ci =
V (S). (Likewise, ∪ki=1Coi = V +(S) and ∪ki=1Cbi = V −(S).)
Given a seed-set S and corresponding clusters, a direct consequence of Lemma 3
is that adding more nodes already contained in these clusters to the seed-set does not
change the payoff.
Lemma 4. Given a set S′ of accepting nodes such that S ⊆ S′ ⊆ V (S), we have
pi(S) = pi(S′).
It therefore suffices to seed a single agent within a cluster. Given a cluster Ci, we
will simply pick an arbitrary node in the interior of the cluster to be the canonical node
i and use that to refer to the cluster even if Ci is formed as a result of seeding another
node j ∈ Coi .
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3 Main Model
Given that all θi are known to the firm, a naive approach would suggest to seed all i
where pii ≥ 0. While this is guaranteed to give a nonnegative payoff, S need not be
optimal.
Example 5. Consider the graph below, where nodes in blue accept the product and
those in red reject the product.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Suppose p = q = 1. Then, a naive approach would set S = ∅, since each of the
resulting clusters to the blue nodes has negative payoff. However, setting S = {1, 2, 6, 7}
has payoff 1.
This phenomenon is a result of the fact that the clusters Ci might have boundaries
that intersect non-trivially. Thus, there could be agents whose pii < 0, but C
b
i is in a
sense “paid for” by seeding other agents; and hence we could have a net-positive payoff
from including i subject to seeding other agents whose cluster boundaries intersect with
Cbi . Using this observation, we will give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding the
optimal seed set under the generalized payoff function using a network flow argument.
We first begin by constructing a flow network.
Given an instance defined by G and φ, we let {C1, C2, · · · , Ck} be the set of all
distinct clusters in G, with disjoint interiors. We form a flow network as follows: set
A = {1, 2, · · · , k} corresponding to the canonical nodes of the clusters above and R be
the set of agents in the boundaries of all clusters. We add an edge from the source node
s to each node i ∈ A with capacity p · |Coi | and label this value by capi, and an edge from
each node j ∈ R to t with capacity q. We add an edge between i and j if and only if
j ∈ Cbi , and set these edges to have infinite capacity. We denote this corresponding flow
network by GN .
Example 6. For the above example, GN is:
1, 2
6, 7
3
4
5
s t
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In this example, the edges out of s have capacities 2p and edges into t have capacities
q. Edges between blue and red notes have infinite capacity. Assuming 4p ≥ 3q, the
min-cut (X,Y ) has Y = {t} and all other nodes in X.
Lemma 7. Given a min-cut (X,Y ) in GN , the optimal seed set in G is A ∩X.
Proof. The min-cut (X,Y ) must have value at most q|R| since we can trivially obtain
that by setting the cut to be (V (GN )\{t}, {t}). Given a node i ∈ X, which we recall
corresponds to the canonical node of a cluster, if a node j ∈ R is exposed to the product
as a result of seeding any node in the cluster, then j ∈ X. Otherwise, we would have
edge (i, j) included in the cut, which has infinite capacity contradicting the minimality
of the cut (X,Y ). Therefore, the min-cut will include all nodes in the seed set as well as
all nodes that are exposed to the product as a result of the corresponding seed set in S.
Note that the edges across the cut are of two forms: (s, i) or (j, t), where i ∈ A and
j ∈ R. The first set of edges contribute ∑i∈A∩Y capi (recall capi = p · |Coi |) and the
latter contributes |R ∩X|q. Therefore, the objective for finding a min-cut can be equally
stated as minimizing, ∑
i∈A∩Y
capi +|R ∩X|q.
over cuts (X,Y ). Note that∑
i∈A
capi =
∑
i∈A∩X
capi +
∑
i∈A∩Y
capi .
Therefore, we have:
( ∑
i∈A∩Y
capi +|R ∩X|q
)
=
(∑
i∈A
capi−
∑
i∈A∩X
capi +|R ∩X|q
)
=
∑
i∈A
capi−
( ∑
i∈A∩X
capi − |R ∩X|q
)
Note the term
(∑
i∈A∩X capi − |R ∩X|q
)
is precisely what the payoff objective func-
tion is maximizing, giving a correspondence between the min-cut and optimal seed
set.
We therefore have the main result of this section:
Theorem 8. There is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the optimal seed set
for Problem 1 when there are no budgets for the size of the seed set.
An interesting phenomenon is that the payoff is not monotone in φ even when
considering optimal seed sets. Take the following example:
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Example 9. Suppose we are given the network below with the numbers specifying the
θi for each corresponding node:
0.2
0.2
0.5
1
1
1
1
If φ ∈ [0, 0.2), we cannot do better than the empty-set. If φ ∈ [0.2, 0.5), the seed set
that includes either of the two left-most nodes gives a payoff of 1, which is optimal. For
the case where φ ∈ (0.5, 1), the empty-set is again optimal.
This example gives a concrete way to think about overexposure phenomena such as
the Groupon effect [6] discussed in the introduction. Viewed in the current terms, we
could say that by using Groupon, one could increase the broad-appeal measure of the
product (e.g., cheaper, signaling higher quality, etc), which therefore exposes the product
to portions of the market that would have previously not been exposed to it, and this
could lead to a worse payoff.
4 Generalized Model
We now consider the generalized model where there are three parameters corresponding
to each agent i, τi ≤ θi ≤ σi. An agent considers a product if τi ≤ φ, adopts a product if
θi ≤ φ, and advertises it to their friends if σi ≤ φ. If an agent is exposed to a product
but φ < τi, then the payoff associated with the agent is 0. If φ ∈ [τi, θi), then the agent
rejects the product, for a payoff of −q < 0. As before, there is a payoff of p > 0 if the
agent accepts the product; however, the agent only advertises the product to its neighbors
after accepting if φ ≥ σi. We therefore have four types of agents:
• Type I: Agents for which φ < τi,
• Type II: Agents for which φ ∈ [τi, θi),
• Type III: Agents for which φ ∈ [θi, σi), and
• Type IV: Agents for which φ ≥ σi.
We denote the set of all agents of Type I by T1 (and likewise for the other types).
The basic model above is the special case where τi = 0 and θi = σi for all i ∈ V . In this
instance, we only have agents of Types II and IV.
Lemma 10. Given any seed set S, we note:
1. pi(S) = pi(S ∪ T1),
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2. pi(S) ≤ pi(S ∪ T3).
Proof. These follow from the observation that:
1. Agents of Type I are those that do not look at the product since φ is below their
threshold τi, and thus do not affect the payoff function when added to any seed set.
2. Agents of Type III are those for which φ ≥ θi, and therefore they accept the
product, but do not advertise it to their friends. Therefore, adding such an agent
to the seed set increases the payoff by exactly p > 0 per agent added.
In the simplest case, we have τi = θi and σi = 1, such that agents will be either of
Type I or III, and the optimal seed set is precisely S = T3. That is, agents only view a
product if they are going to accept it and they never advertise it to their neighbors, and
there is no cascade triggered as a result of seeding agents.
When this is not the case, we will note that the results in the previous section can
be adapted to this setting to find an optimal seed set efficiently. Given a network G in
this generalized setting, consider a corresponding network G′ = (V ′, E′), which is the
subgraph of G consisting of agents of only Types II and IV. We can then apply the
algorithm in the previous section to this subgraph G′ to find an optimal seed set. We
claim that the union of this with agents of Type III yields an optimal seed set in G.
Theorem 11. Given a product with a value φ and a network G with agents of parameters
τi, θi, and σi, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an optimal seed set to
maximize the payoff function.
Proof. Given such a graph G, and a corresponding subgraph G′ with an optimal seed set
S′, we argue that S′ ∪ T3 is an optimal seed set in G.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose S is an optimal seed set in G, such that
pi(S) > pi(S′ ∪ T3). By Lemma 10, we can assume that S does not include any agent of
Type I and includes all agents of Type III. This assumption implies pi(S\T3) > pi(S′).
But since S\T3 ⊆ G′, this contradicts the optimality of S′.
Returning to the implications for the Groupon effect, we note that a firm can efficiently
maximize its payoff over the choice of both the seed set and φ. Suppose the firm knows
the parameters τi, θi, σi for each of the agents i. Given n agents, these values divide up
the unit interval into at most 4n subintervals Ij . It is easy to see that the payoff depends
only on which subinterval φ is contained in, but does not vary within a subinterval.
Earlier, we saw the payoff need not be monotone in φ; but by trying values of φ in each
of the 4n subintervals, the firm can determine a value of φ and a seed set that maximize
its payoff.
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5 Budgeted Seeding is Hard
In this section, we show that the seeding problem, even for the initial model, is NP-hard
if we consider the case where there is a budget k for the size of the seed set and we want
to find S subject to the constraint that |S| ≤ k. In the traditional influence maximization
literature, we leverage properties of the payoff function such as its submodularity or
supermodularity to give algorithms that find optimal or near-optimal seed sets. The
payoff function here, however, is neither submodular nor supermodular.
Example 12. Take the network shown in figure below. Set p = q = 1:
1
2
3
4
5 6
7
Figure 1: Network where nodes in blue accept have θi ≤ φ and those in red have θi > φ.
Supermodularity states that given S′ ⊆ S and x /∈ S,
f(S′ ∪ {x})− f(S′) ≤ f(S ∪ {x})− f(S).
Set S′ = {1}, S = {1, 6}, and let x be node 7. Then, supermodularity would give:
pi({1, 7})− pi(1) ≤ pi{1, 6, 7} − pi{1, 6}
2 ≤ 0
Submodularity states that,
f(S′ ∪ {x})− f(S′) ≥ f(S ∪ {x})− f(S).
A counterexample to this is obtained by setting S′ = ∅, S = {1} and x = {7}.
Here, we show an even stronger hardness result: it is NP-hard to decide if there
is a (budgeted) set yielding positive payoff. Since it is NP-hard to tell whether the
optimum in any instance is positive or negative, it is therefore also NP-hard to provide
an approximation algorithm with any multiplicative guarantee — a sharp contrast with
the multiplicative approximation guarantees available for budgeted problems in more
traditional influence maximization settings.
Theorem 13. The decision problem of whether there exists a seed set S with |S| ≤ k
and pi(S) > 0 is NP-complete.
Proof. We will prove this using a reduction from the NP-complete Clique problem on
d-regular graphs: given a d-regular graph G and a number k, the question is to determine
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whether there exists a k-clique — a set of k nodes that are all mutually adjacent. (We
also require d ≥ k.)
We will reduce an instance of k-clique on d-regular graphs to an instance of the
decision version of our budgeted seed set problem as follows. Given such an instance of
Clique specified by a d-regular graph G and a number k, we construct an instance of the
budgeted seed set problem on a new graph G′ obtained from G as follows: we replace
each (i, k) ∈ E, with two new edges (i, j), (j, k), where j is a new node introduced by
subdividing (i, k). Let V be the set of nodes originally in G, and V ′ the set of nodes
introduced by subdividing. In the seed set instance on G′, we define θi and φ such that
θi < φ for all i ∈ V and θi > φ for all i ∈ V ′. We define the payoff coefficients p, q by
q = 1 and p = d− (k − 1)/2 +  for some 0 <  < 1/n2.
We will show that G has a k-clique if and only if there is a seed set of size at most k
in G′ with positive payoff.
First, suppose that S is a set of k nodes in G that are all mutually adjacent, and
consider the corresponding set of nodes S in G′. As a seed set, S has k accepting nodes
and kd− (k2) rejecting neighbors, since G is d-regular but the nodes on the (k2) subdivided
edges are double-counted. Thus the payoff from S is kp−(kd−(k2)) = k(p−d+(k−1)/2),
which is positive by our choice of p.
For the converse, suppose S has size k′ ≤ k and has positive payoff in G′. Since the seed
set consists entirely of accepting neighbors (any others can be omitted without decreasing
the payoff), S ⊆ V , and hence so the neighbors of S reject the product. If S induces ` edges
in G, then the payoff from S includes a negative term from each neighbor, with the nodes
on the ` subdivided edges double-counted, so the payoff is k′p− (k′d− `). If |S| = k′ < k,
then since ` ≤ (k′2 ), the payoff is at most k′p− (k′d− (k′2 )) = k′(p− d+ (k′− 1)/2), which
is negative by our choice of p. If |S| = k and ` ≤ (k2) − 1, then the payoff is at most
kp− (kd− ((k2)− 1)) = k(p− d+ (k− 1)/2− 1/k), which again is negative by our choice
of p. Thus it must be that |S| = k and ` = (k2), so S induces a k-clique as required.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present some computational results using datasets obtained from
SNAP (Stanford Network Analysis Project). In particular, we consider an email network
from a European research institution [18, 22] and a text message network from a social-
networking platform at UC-Irvine [21].
The former is a directed network of emails sent between employees over an 803-day
period, with 986 nodes and 24929 directed edges. The latter is a directed network of text
messages sent between students through an online social network at UC Irvine over a
193-day period, with 1899 nodes and 20296 directed edges. In both networks, we use
the edge (i, j) to indicate that i sent at least one email or text to node j over the time
period considered.
For both of these networks, we present results corresponding to the general model. We
consider 100 evenly-spaced values of φ in [0, 1] and compare the seed set obtained by our
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algorithm with some natural baselines. The parameters τi ≤ θi ≤ σi for each agent are
chosen as follows: we draw three numbers independently from an underlying distribution
(we analyze both the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and the Gaussian distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1); we then sort these three numbers in non-decreasing
order and set them to be τi, θi, and σi respectively.
For each φ we run 100 trials and present the average payoff. The average time to
run one simulation is 0.915 seconds for the text network and 0.454 seconds for the email
network. This includes the time to read the data and assemble the network; the average
time spent only on computing the min-cut for the corresponding network is 0.052 and
0.054 seconds respectively.
For each of these figures, we give a natural upper-bound which is the number of
agents such that θi < φ. This includes agents of Type III and IV. We note that the seed
set obtained by our algorithm often gives a payoff close to this upper bound. We compare
this to two natural baselines: the first sets agents of Type III to be the seed set and the
second sets agents of both Types III and IV to be the seed set. We show that the first
baseline performs well for lower values of φ, where the second baseline underperforms
significantly; and, the second picks up performance significantly for higher values of φ
while the first baseline suffers. The seed set obtained by our algorithm, on the other
hand, outperforms both baselines by a notable margin for moderate values of φ. This
gap in performance corresponds to the overexposure effect in our models.
Figure 2: Payoff as a function of product quality φ for (a) email and (b) text networks for
the general model where τi, θi, σi are chosen from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] . The
blue curve represents the natural upper bound of the total number of agents with θi < φ.
The green line corresponds to the payoff obtained by seeding agents whose τi ≤ φ. The
purple line represents the number of agents of Type III, where φ ∈ [θi, σi) and the red
line corresponds to the seed set selected by our algorithm. The difference between the
red and green curve captures the Groupon Effect of overexposure.
Each of the figures show that the seed set chosen by our algorithm outperforms these
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Figure 3: These plots give payoff for (a) email and (b) text network for the general model
with parameters chosen from the Gaussian distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation 0.1 for 100 evenly-spaced φ values in [0, 1].
natural baselines. In Figure 2, we note for φ < 2/3 the optimal seed set obtained through
our algorithm is close to picking only agents of Type III. Adding on agents of Type IV
performs worse than both seeding just agents of Type III or the optimal seed set. This
changes for φ values over 2/3. Here, the number of agents of Type III drops, and thus
the payoff obtained by seeding agents of Type III drops with it. On the other hand, the
seed set consisting of all agents of Types III and IV picks up performance, coming close
to the optimal seed set for φ ≈ 0.7. This behavior appears in both networks.
7 Further Related Work
As noted in the introduction, our work — through its focus on selecting a seed set of nodes
with which to start a cascade — follows the motivation underlying the line of theoretical
work on influence maximization [9, 15, 24]. There has been some theoretical work
showing the counter-intuitive outcome where increased effort results in a less successful
spread. An example is [27], where they show that due to the separation of the infection
and viral stage, there are cases where an increased effort can result in a lower rate of
spread. A related line of work has made use of rich datasets on digital friend-to-friend
recommendations on e-commerce sites to analyze the flow of product recommendations
through an underlying social network [17]. Further work has experimentally explored
influence strategies, with individuals either immediately broadcasting their product
adoption to their social network, or selecting individuals to recommend the product to [2].
The consequences of negative consumer reactions have been analyzed in a range
of different domains. In the introduction we noted examples involving Groupon [6],
book prizes [16], and on-line media collections [1]. Although experimentally introduced
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negative ratings tend to be compensated for in later reviews, positive reviews can lead
to herding effects [19]. There has also been research seeking to quantify the economic
impact of negative ratings, in contexts ranging from seller reputations in on-line auctions
[4, 23] to on-line product reviews [20]. This work has been consistent in ascribing non-
trivial economic consequences to negative consumer impressions and their articulation
through on-line ratings and reviews. Recent work has also considered the rate at which
social-media content receives “likes” as a fraction of its total impressions, for quantifying
a social media audience’s response to cascading content [26].
The literature on pricing goods with network effects is another domain that has
developed models in which consumers are heterogeneous in their response to diffusing
content. The underlying models are different from what we pursue here; a canonical
structure in the literature on pricing with network effects is a set of consumers with
different levels of willingness to pay for a product [14]. This willingness to pay can change
as the product becomes more popular; a line of work has thus considered how a product
with network effects can be priced adaptively over time as it diffuses through the network
[3, 10]. The variation in willingness to pay can be viewed as a type of “criticality,” with
some consumers evaluating products more strictly and others less strictly. But a key
contrast with our work is that highly critical individuals in these pricing models do not
generally confer a negative payoff when they refuse to purchase an item.
8 Conclusion
Theoretical models of viral marketing in social networks have generally used the assump-
tion that all exposures to a product are beneficial to the firm conducting the marketing.
A separate line of empirical research in marketing, however, provides a more complex
picture, in which different potential customers may have either positive or negative
reactions to a product, and it can be a mistake to pursue a strategy that elicits too many
negative reactions from potential customers.
In this work, we have proposed a new set of theoretical models for viral marketing,
by taking into account these types of overexposure effects. Our models make it possible
to consider the optimization trade-offs that arise from trying to reach a large set of
positively inclined potential customers while reducing the number of negatively inclined
potential customers who are reached in the process. Even in the case where the marketer
has no budget on the number of people it can expose to the product, this tension between
positive and negative reactions leads to a non-trivial optimization problem. We provide
a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem, using techniques from network flow, and
we prove hardness for the case in which a budget constraint is added to the problem
formulation. Computational experiments show how our polynomial-time algorithm yields
strong results on network data.
Our framework suggests many directions for future work. It would be interesting to
integrate the role of negative payoffs in our model here with other technical components
that are familiar from the literature on influence maximization, particularly the use of
richer (and potentially probabilistic) functions governing the spread from one participant
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in the network to another. For example, when nodes have non-trivial thresholds for
adoption — requiring both that they evaluate the product positively and also that they
have heard about it from at least k other people, for some k > 1 — how significantly do
the structures of optimal solutions change?
It will also be interesting to develop richer formalisms for the process by which
positive and negative reactions arise when potential customers are exposed to good
or bad products. With such extended formalisms we can more fully bring together
considerations of overexposure and reputational costs into the literature on network-
based marketing.
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